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ABSTRACT 
Database outsourcing is emerging today as a successful paradigm allowing data owners to 
ship their data to the external service provider for the distribution of resources. An important 
problem to be addressed in this paradigm concerns the protection of outsourced data from 
unauthorized access even from the service provider’s server, which is not fully trusted. Several 
encryption schemes and access control mechanisms have been suggested to protect the 
outsourced data from unauthorized disclosure. However, by implementing these approaches, 
data owners are not capable of controlling and protecting the disclosure of the individual 
sensitive attributes of their data. Therefore, we propose a new column-level access control 
mechanism that is based on subkeys, which would allow a data owner to further control the 
access to his data at the column-level. We also propose a new mechanism to efficiently reduce 
the number of keys maintained by a data owner in cases when the users have different access 
privileges to different columns of the data being shared. 
Keywords: Access control, column-level access control, database encryption. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The amount of data held by organizations is increasing quickly and it often contains 
sensitive information. The management and protection of such data are expensive. An emerging 
solution to this problem is called database as a service (DAS), in which, an organization’s 
database is stored at an external service provider. The advantages of DAS are cost savings and 
service benefits. There are three main entities in the DAS scenario (Fig. 1):  
• Data owner:  individual or organization that is the subject of the data made available for 
controlled external use. 
• User: individual or organization that requests data from the system. 
• Server: organization that receives the data sent from the data owners and makes it 
available for distribution to clients.   
DAS scenario can be classified into two main models [12]. The first one is SS model 
(Single user - Service provider) where a single data owner is also the unique client and their data 
is outsourced to the external database server. The second one is MMS model (Multiple data 
owner - Multiple clients Service provider) where multiple data owners outsource their databases 
to the service provider and multiple clients may also have access to the outsourced database on 
some agreement basis. The instances of MMS model are the two well-known electronic health 
record systems named Google Health and Microsoft HealthVault, in which patient’s health 
records are created, stored, used, exchanged, and retrieved over the Internet. 
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Figure 1. Block diagram of DAS scenario 
In DAS scenario, however, the data owner store their data on an external server, which is 
typically not under their control, and it is assumed that this server cannot be trusted with the 
confidentiality of the database’s content. It is important to protect data owner’s data from 
unauthorized access by intruders and even the server’s operators. 
The MMS model is more complex than the SS model regarding to the needs of security 
requirements. Database encryption was regarded as a solution for protecting data from 
unauthorized disclosure. Existing encryption schemes assume that the client has complete access 
to the query results [6, 13, 14]. Such encryption schemes can only be applied for SS model. They 
do not fit MMS model in which the data owner often requires the enforcement of access 
restriction to different users. Some access control mechanisms have recently been proposed, but 
by using them, the data owners can only control access at the tuple-level and they are not able to 
restrict access to some of the more sensitive attributes of the data being shared [1, 3, 4, 11].  
Despite the fact that health care providers such as Google Health and Microsoft Corp.’s 
HealthVault comply with the U.S Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), 
the privacy of patients is still at risk. Patients are required to trust the provider when using 
Microsoft HealthVault or Google Health. They cannot control whether the providers really 
adhere to their promises to protect their data and disclose personal data only to parties the 
patients have agreed to. They also cannot restrict access to their health records to some of the 
more sensitive columns.  
The contributions of this study are: (a) a new access control mechanism called column-
level access control, which would allow a data owner in MMS model to further control the 
access to his data at the column-level, (b) a new mechanism to efficiently reduce the number of 
keys maintained by the data owner when users have different access privileges to different 
columns of the data being shared.  
2. RELATED WORK 
Recent access control approaches combine cryptographic protection and authorization 
access control and enforce access control via selective encryption, which means users can 
decrypt only the data they are authorized to access [1]. They exploit a structure called the user 
tree hierarchy to represent the relationship between users and information items. The key for 
accessing lower-level nodes is based on the keys of their predecessors by using a family of one-
way functions [10]. However, the complexity of the algorithm for building the tree hierarchy is 
exponential and it needs reconstruction after most of the modifications of the access control 
policies have been accomplished. Zych et al. [11] presented a key management scheme that was 
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based on a partial order between the user groups and used the Diffie-Hellman key generation 
algorithm for the key derivation. The algorithm for constructing the hierarchy and the generation 
scheme are very complex and costly. El-khoury et al. [4] suggested a key management scheme 
that was based on the binary trie structure, using whichever keys ring for each group of users are 
generated. The key management complexity is reduced and most of the data access policy 
updates do not require significant changes to the structure, which reduces the number of key 
generations and data re-keyings. De Capitani di Vimercati et al. [3] proposed a two-layer access 
control mechanism that is based on the application of selective encryption. This solution has the 
benefits of being faster and less costly when the authorization policy is updated. However, all of 
the above-mentioned encryption schemes and access control mechanisms can only support tuple-
level access control and fail to guarantee requirement 3. By using them, the data owners cannot 
restrict access to some of the more sensitive attributes of the shared data or have to partition the 
relation containing the shared data into fragments with the full share. This creates a lot of 
relations, and thus creates difficulties in effectively managing the database and query processing.  
3. APPROACH FOR COLUMN-LEVEL ACCESS CONTROL 
The database encryption with subkeys first proposed by Davida et al. [2] had the 
advantages of record orientation, security, and each field can be accessed under a different key. 
Using it, a user can read only some given fields depending on the readable subkeys he has 
without revealing all the attributes’ values. We suggest using the encryption scheme proposed by 
Hacigümüs et al. [6] for MMS model, but with a modification of the encryption function. The 
encryption scheme with subkeys is used instead of the block cipher techniques, such as AES, 
RSA, or DES as in original scheme. For each relation R(A1, A2, ..., An), the data owner stores 
encrypted relation RS(etuple, A1S, A2S, ..., AnS) on the server, where the attribute etuple is the 
encryption form of a record using the encryption scheme with subkeys. The data owners follow 
these steps to protect their data:  
Step 1: The data owners encrypt their data by tuples and thereby they grant access to users 
by tuples. The data owners first partition their data into disjoined row categories. Each row 
category consists of one or more rows. Users who have the same privileges to a row category are 
gathered into a single group. They describe the access policies to their data by using an access 
matrix, called an access matrix by row (Error! Reference source not found.). 
Step 2: The data owners construct the binary trie for this row access matrix [4] to decide the 
number of keys that will be used to encrypt the data (Fig. 2). The data owner restricts the access 
to the sensitive columns by giving out only the subkeys corresponding to the columns that the 
user has access permission to. The key derivation method which is described in section 6, is used 
to derive the necessary keys (Table 2).  
Step 3: If the users in a group have different access privileges to different columns of a row 
category, the data owner describes the access policies using other access matrices, and each is 
called an access matrix by column, and also manages the keys by using the binary trie. Users 
hold only some of the subkeys and derive the necessary ones to read the data with the granted 
permission. Appropriate keys are communicated to users by the data owner via a secure channel. 
Using our approach, the data owners can protect their data from unauthorized disclosure and 
they can restrict access to sensitive columns of the data being shared. 
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Table 1. Access matrix by row 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Keys held by each group of users and keys must be derivable 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. KEY MANAGEMENT FOR COLUMN-LEVEL ACCESS CONTROL 
Database Encryption with Subkeys: There are variations when using the Chinese 
Remainder Theorem (CRT) for encrypting a database [2, 8, 7]. In DAS scenario, the 
convenience for a user to access data at a service provider is important, therefore an encryption 
scheme requiring less keys held by each valid user was chosen. We use an encryption with 
subkeys developed by Davida et al. [2] in DAS scenario. Let Ci be the ciphertext of an encrypted 
record, and let dj be the reading subkey for field j. There are m records in a relation and n fields 
in each record. The encryption procedure is done by forming  
; 
where , xij is the value of field j of record i, || is the concatenation, rij is the random 
value for field j used for preventing attacks originated from using CRT, rij ||xij < dj, ej is the 
encryption key for field j, and bj is the multiplicative inverse of D/dj with moduli dj. In addition, 
the decryption procedure is: rij || xij = Ci mod dj, j = 1, …, n. By discarding the random bit rij, one 
can obtain the jth field data xij of record i.  
Key Derivation Method: When using an encryption scheme with subkeys, the key of a 
security class SCi consists of multiple different subkeys (di1, di2, ..., din), dij is a prime and also 
the decryption key used for decrypting the jth attribute. The key of security class SCj, which is an 
1 2 3 4 
1 
2 
3 
4 
 Keys held Keys derived 
g1 k1 k1111, k1011 
g2 k01, k11 k0111, k1111, k0101, k0100 
g3 k011, k101, k111 k0111, k1111, k1011 
g4 k0111, k1111, k1011, k0101   
 
Figure 2. Binary trie structure for access matrix by row 
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immediate child of SCi, is computed by (f1(di1), f2(di2), ..., fn(din)), and each fi is a one-way 
function [10]. The key of the security class SCj also consists of multiple subkeys, each subkey 
must be a prime too (for properly using the CRT). So, each function fi must be a one-way 
function that receives a prime number as the input and outputs a prime number. Please see the 
appendix for a method to construct this function. 
Column-level Access Control: If a user group has full access authorization to all the 
columns of a row category, each user in this group holds all the subkeys of each key assigned to 
each group. By derivation, they obtain the actual keys to access all the columns of the row 
category with authorization. If a user group has access authorization to only some attributes of a 
row category, and the access authorizations are the same to all the members of the group, they 
are given appropriate subkeys to access the corresponding columns. In the cases when different 
users in a user group G have different access privileges to different columns of a row category, 
the data owner describes these privileges by using other access matrices, each is called access 
matrix by column. The number of rows of this matrix is equal to the number of subgroups of 
users in the group G and the number of columns it has equals to the number of groups of 
columns with different access authorizations. We construct the binary trie structure 
corresponding to this column access matrix. Each subgroup of users holds just some subkeys. 
These subkeys can then be used to derive other subkeys in order to access the other columns 
with granted permission. 
Key Management: In our proposed access control mechanism, each user owns some 
subkeys (which are used to derive other subkeys) to access the fields he has access authorization 
for. Management of the number of subkeys is difficult for users. We propose using the key 
management method in [7] to handle this problem. 
(1) Assigns each field a public prime number pj, j =1, 2, …, n. 
(2) Computes the secret master key MKi by CRT for user i: 
MKi = dj mod pj for some j 1 ≤ j ≤ (n+1) where dn+1 and pn+1 are random secret key and the 
prime number of a dummy field used to prevent users from colluding to disclose the secret 
master key of user i.  
User i keeps only the secret master key MKi. 
(3) To read the field j, user i computes dj = MKi mod pj to get subkey dj. 
5. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
We have proposed a new column-level access control mechanism based on subkeys. Our 
proposal has the following characteristics:  
(1) It allows a data owner in the complex model of database outsourcing service, MMS 
model, to further control the access of their data at the column-level. 
(2) It efficiently reduces the number of keys maintained by a data owner when users have 
different access privileges to different columns of the data being shared. These subkeys are 
encrypted one time more (using CRT) so that each user holds only one secret master key, but 
they can derive the necessary subkeys to access data with authorization. 
For future work, we will investigate the dynamic cases of access control in which the users 
and the privileges changed frequently. We will also analyze the system’s performance when we 
implement our proposals.  
 
 125
REFERENCES 
1. Damiani E., De Capitani di Vimercati, S., Foresti, S., Jajodia, S., Paraboschi, and S. 
Samarati P. - Key Management for Multi-User Encrypted Databases. Proc. of the 2005 
ACM Workshop on Storage Security and Survivability,  2005, pp.74-83. 
2. Davida G. I., Wells D. L., and Kam J. B. - A Database Encryption System with Subkeys. 
ACM Transactions on Database Systems 6 (2) (1981) 312-328. 
3. De Capitani di Vimercati S., Foresti S, Jajodia S., Paraboschi S., and  Samarati P. - Over-
encryption: Management of Access Control Evolution on Outsourced Data, VLDB, 2007, 
pp. 123-134. 
4. El-khoury V., Bennani N., and Ouksel A. M. - Distributed Key Management in Dynamic 
Outsourced Databases: a Trie-based Approach, First Int. Conf. on Advances in Databases, 
Knowledge, and Data Applications, 2009, pp. 56-61. 
5. Google, Health Privacy Policy, http://www.google.com/intl/en-US/health/privacy.html 
6. Hacigümüs H., Iyer B. R., Li C., and Mehrotra S. - Executing SQL over encrypted data in 
the database-service-provider model, in SIGMOD, 2002, pp. 216-227. 
7. Hwang M. S., and Yang W. P. - A Two-Phase Encryption Scheme for Enhancing 
Database Security, J. Systems Software, Elsevier Science (1995) 257-265. 
8. Lin C. H., Chang C. C., and Lee C. T. - A record-oriented cryptosystem for database 
sharing, in Int. Computer Symposium, 1990, pp. 328-329. 
9. Microsoft, HealthVault Privacy Policy,  
         https://account.healthvault.com/help.aspx?topicid=PrivacyPolicy (2009) 
10. Sandhu R. S. - Cryptographic implementation of a Tree Hierarchy for access control, 
Elsevier, 1988, pp. 95-98. 
11. Zych A., Petkovic M., and Jonker W. - Efficient key management for cryptographically 
enforced access control, Elsevier Science, 2008, pp. 410-417. 
12. Khanh, D. T. - Security Issues in Outsourced XML Databases. Open and Novel Issues in 
XML Database Applications: Future Directions and Advanced Technologies, IGI Global, 
ISBN: 978-1-60566-308-1, 2009, pp. 231-261. 
13. Damiani E., Vimercati S. D. C., Jajodia S., Paraboschi S., and Samarati P. - Balancing 
confidentiality and efficiency in untrusted relational DBMSs. Proceedings of the 10th 
ACM Conference on Computer and Communication Security, Washington DC, USA, 
2003, pp. 93-102. 
14. Lin P., and Candan, K. S. -  Hiding  traversal  of  tree  structured  data  from  untrusted  
data  stores. Proceedings of the 2nd International Workshop on Security in Information 
Systems, Porto, Portugal, 2004, pp. 314-323.   
 
 
 126
APPENDIX 
We present a method for constructing a one-way function that receives a prime as an input 
and gives a prime as an output. Using this algorithm, the users with the same privileges will 
generate the same keys at different times for deriving keys to access the specific data. 
Theorem. Assume that n -1 = F×R = , where R < , and an integer b such 
that bn-1 ≡ 1 (mod n) exists and , i=1,…, s. Then n is a prime. 
Algorithm G: Generating a prime of d digits with a given seed a. 
(1) Generate a Q that has d-2 digits using the consecutive hash values of seed a: 
Q=h(a)||…||h(a), where || is the concatenation operator. 
(2) Find the greatest R such that (R < Q) and (1 + RQ ≡ 1 (mod 6)).  
If p = RQ + 1 is a pseudo-prime with base 2 and 3,  
(3) then return p.  
(4) R = R+6. 
(5) Goto (3). 
Generating key function  
Let h be a one-way hash function h: Zn → H, i.e. given y∈H, it is hard to find x∈Zn such 
that h(x)=y, where H is the hash value space. For example, MD5 and SHA are two popular one-
way hash functions. Let g be a generating prime function g: H → P, where P is a prime space. 
Let f: Zn → P be defined by f =goh, then f is a one-way function. Indeed, given y=f(x)=g(h(x)), 
because h is a one-way hash function, it is hard to find x∈Zn such that y=f(x)=g(h(x)). To 
generate a prime, we use the combination of the above generating prime function and the hash 
function SHA. 
Algorithm F: Generating key based on a given prime p. 
(1) Compute a = SHA (p). 
(2) Generate a prime q using the algorithm G with seed a. 
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